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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the district 
court properly granted summary judgment to the plaintiff 
class against the defendants. The district court held as a 
matter of law that the defendants' Chester, Virginia 
administrative center was the plaintiffs' "single site of 
employment" under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3)(B), and therefore 
awarded damages and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. We 
hold that a genuine issue exists as to whether the Chester 
center was the plaintiffs' "single site of employment," so 
that the district court's grant of summary judgment was 
improper. We will reverse and remand. 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs in this action are a class of over one 
hundred former employees of the American Tobacco 
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Company ("the Company"), who worked throughout the 
United States as traveling salespeople. Officially titled Field 
Sales Representatives ("sales representatives"), the plaintiffs 
were each assigned to a geographical district in which they 
were responsible, along with other sales representatives, for 
selling the Company's products to wholesalers and retailers 
in that district. Altogether, the Company employed over one 
thousand sales representatives, located in 150 different 
districts covering the entire United States. Sales 
representatives were each provided a company car, and 
spent an overwhelming proportion of their time "on the 
road" visiting customers within their district. 
 
The sales representatives communicated with other 
employees at the Company mostly by telephone. There were 
two primary contacts. First, each sales representative kept 
in close contact with a district sales manager, who, like the 
sales representatives, lived and worked in the designated 
district. Each district sales manager was responsible for 
managing the handful of sales representatives assigned 
within the district; like the sales representatives, most 
district sales managers worked from home, and had no 
other permanent office. The sales representatives' second 
significant contact was with the Company's administrative 
center in Chester, Virginia. Sales representatives called the 
Chester center every day to check messages, and also 
contacted the center regularly to order supplies. 
 
The events that prompted this lawsuit occurred on 
January 11, 1995, soon after the defendant Brown & 
Williamson acquired the Company from American Brands, 
Inc. On that day, the Company summoned the sales 
representatives to "sales meetings" held across the country. 
At the "sales meetings," Company officials announced to 
the sales representatives that they were being laid off, 
effective immediately. The sales representatives were forced 
to hand over their keys, samples, and distribution lists to 
Company representatives before they were allowed to leave. 
The Company also encouraged the employees to sign 
release forms, which would entitle each employee to a 
week's pay and job counseling services in exchange for a 
waiver of rights to additional benefits. 
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The plaintiffs in this action are employees who did not 
sign the release form. They brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against Brown & Williamson, American 
Tobacco, and American Brands, Inc. (collectively,"B&W") 
alleging that B&W had violated the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. SS 2101-09, 
by failing to warn the plaintiffs of their impending layoffs.1 
Enacted in 1988, WARN requires that employers provide 
written notice to those employees who will be subject to a 
"mass layoff " sixty days before the layoff occurs. See 29 
U.S.C. S 2102(a).2 Congress defined a "mass layoff " as "a 
reduction in force which . . . results in an employment loss 
at the single site of employment during any 30-day period 
for . . . at least 50 employees." 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3) 
(emphasis added). The Act entitles affected employees who 
are not notified of an impending "mass layoff" to damages 
from their former employer in an amount equal to back pay 
for each day of the violation, for up to sixty days. See 29 
U.S.C. S 2104(a). 
 
Following class certification, it became clear that the 
plaintiffs' recovery hinged on whether B&W's action was a 
"mass layoff." Specifically, the central question was whether 
the action had resulted in an employment loss of more than 
fifty employees at one "single site of employment" as 
required by 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3)(B).3 In an order dated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. American Brands, Inc. is no longer a party to this action, as all 
claims 
against it were dismissed on December 19, 1995. 
 
2. 29 U.S.C. S 2102(a) (West Supp. 1998) provides in relevant part: 
 
        An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until 
       the end of a 60-day period after the employer serves written notice 
       of such an order-- 
 
        (1) to each representative of the affected employ ees as of the 
time 
       of the notice or, if there is no such representative at that time, 
to 
       each affected employee; and 
 
        (2) to the State dislocated worker unit (designat ed or created 
under 
       title III of the Job Training Partnership Act) and the chief 
elected 
       official of the unit of local government within which such closing 
or 
       layoff is to occur. 
 3. B&W did not dispute that they had failed to provide the plaintiffs with 
written notice of the impending layoffs. In fact, the record reveals that 
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September 23, 1996, the district court announced that it 
would treat pending discovery applications as cross- 
motions for summary judgment, focusing on the "single 
site" requirement. The parties responded with both evidence 
and legal argument attempting to show as a matter of law 
that the single site requirement had (or had not) been 
satisfied. 
 
The sales representatives argued that they were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law because the Chester, 
Virginia administrative center was their "single site of 
employment." The sales representatives offered statements 
by former employees suggesting that the Chester center 
was the primary contact point for sales representatives in 
the field. According to the statements, sales representatives 
received their instructions from and reported to the 
administrative center in Chester. App. 2208-10; App. 1936. 
Each sales representative was required to call Chester every 
day to check messages, which frequently included 
instructions from management left on the sales 
representative's voice mail. App. 1936-37. Sales 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
B&W had gone to great lengths to keep the layoffs a secret. The only 
action by B&W that could be construed as any type of notification was 
the mailing of a letter to local government officials the day before the 
layoffs. The top of the letter reads, "NOTICE REQUIRED UNDER THE 
WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT." The 
letter continues: 
 
        This notice is to advise you that The American Tobacco Company 
       ("American Tobacco") will undertake a layoff at its Administrative 
       Service Center located at 13203 North Enon Church Road, Chester, 
       Virginia, 23831. 
 
        While the number of affected employees has not yet been 
       determined, it is expected that the layoff will affect 
approximately 
       1550 employees at the Chester facility (inclusive of approximately 
       1200 Field Sales employees, located nationwide). 
 
        American Tobacco will advise affected employees of the layoff 
       commencing January 11, 1995. The date of separation may be 
       immediately upon notification to the affected employee, or, in some 
       cases, may be at a later date. 
 
App. 1880. 
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representatives also communicated with the Chester center 
to obtain sales materials, supplies, and other items they 
needed to perform their job. App. 2178-79. The sales 
representatives argued that they were entitled to judgment 
because their affidavits proved that the Chester center was 
their "single site of employment." 
 
B&W's affidavits and arguments pointed to a different 
conclusion. According to B&W, it was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law because the sales representatives' "single 
site[s] of employment" were the geographical districts where 
they actually worked. B&W maintained that the districts 
were the true hubs of the sales representatives' activities, 
as the local district sales managers were the employees who 
directed, managed, and monitored the sales 
representatives. B&W relied on various sources for support. 
First, they offered the affidavit of Mr. Randy Groonwald, a 
district sales manager from Milwaukee, who stated that his 
sales representatives were assigned work from him, not 
from Chester, Virginia. Groonwald also reported that he 
was responsible for the day-to-day concerns of his sales 
representatives, including hiring, training, job performance 
reviews, and approval of expenses. App. 1017-18. 
Groonwald's statements were supported by B&W's internal 
documents, which showed that supervision of sales 
representatives was the major task of district sales 
managers. App. 1223. B&W also relied upon its official job 
description for the sales representative position, which 
indicated that the sales representatives' primary contact 
within the company was with their district sales managers. 
App. 1226. 
 
In response to the sales representatives' position that 
Chester was their single site of employment, B&W 
maintained that the Chester center was simply an 
administrative hub through which certain mailings and 
messages authored outside of Chester were sent to the 
sales representatives. Sales representatives were hired, 
trained, and instructed within their district, B&W noted; 
they worked entirely within their district; and they reported 
to their district sales managers within their district. Sales 
representatives did not regularly visit the Chester, Virginia 
center. In fact, named plaintiff Thomas A. Marshall visited 
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the center only twice, on special trips to recognize his 
outstanding sales record, App. 2266, and named plaintiff 
Louis A. Ciarlante never visited Chester at all. App. 2376. 
Accordingly, B&W argued that the districts, rather than the 
Chester center, were the plaintiffs' "single site of 
employment." Because there were fewer than fifty 
employees within each geographic district, B&W claimed 
that its action could not constitute a "mass layoff" under 
29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3), and that it was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
 
In an order dated November 6, 1996, the district court 
concluded as a matter of law that the Chester center was 
the plaintiffs' single site of employment and entered 
summary judgment in their favor. The district court 
reasoned that the voluminous record in the case 
"establishes, without any genuine dispute, that all 
instructions, assignments, rules, and orders to the plaintiff 
salesmen emanated from the Chester, Virginia 
headquarters." As a result, the Chester center was the 
plaintiffs' single site of employment. The court recognized 
that the local district sales managers played a role in 
issuing assignments to and receiving reports from the sales 
representatives, but found that the role of the sales 
managers was not significant. "Any contrary view," the 
court explained, "would . . . undermine the purposes of the 
statute. I am confident that Congress did not contemplate 
permitting a company to lay off its entire sales force of 
hundreds of people without being chargeable with having 
achieved a `mass layoff.' "4 
 
Having found B&W liable, the court next considered the 
damages owed to the sales representatives. The first issue 
was whether the full statutory damage award should be 
reduced by the amount of severance payments that B&W 
had made to the employees following the layoffs. B&W 
contended that the answer was "yes," because 29 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court believed that its decision was bolstered by the 
letters 
the Company had sent to local officials on January 10, 1995. See supra 
note 3. The district court opined that the letters "make[ ] clear that the 
defendants themselves had concluded, at the time, that the WARN Act 
did apply to these lay-offs." 
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S 2104(a)(2) directed that damage awards be reduced by 
"any wages paid by the employer to the employee for the 
period of the violations . . . [and] any voluntary and 
unconditional payment by the employer to the employee 
that is not required by any legal obligation." 29 U.S.C. 
S 2104(a)(2). The district court disagreed, holding that the 
damage award should not be reduced because the 
severance pay awards were ERISA payments that B&W was 
legally obligated to pay. 
 
Second, the court held that the statutory damage award 
of back pay from a sixty day period as directed by 29 U.S.C. 
S 2104(a)(1) was to be calculated based on the pay 
equivalent of sixty actual working days, rather than the 
amount that a salaried employee would earn in a sixty day 
time period. The court thereupon entered an order granting 
summary judgment for the sales representatives. 
 
B&W responded by submitting a Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment and for Reconsideration and 
Clarification. Attached to this motion were additional sworn 
declarations by Company employees. One such employee, 
Kathi Reynolds, stated that when she was a sales 
representative from 1985 to 1989, she sometimes received 
instructions that were mailed through the Chester facility, 
but that in almost every case, the true source of her 
instructions was the Company's executive headquarters in 
either Stamford, Connecticut or Conyers, Georgia. App. 
2462. According to B&W, this affidavit illustrated that the 
district court had misunderstood the plaintiffs' statements 
that the sales representatives had received instructions 
"from" Chester. B&W asked the district court to reconsider 
its decision, in light of the new affidavits and the district 
court's haste in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
sales representatives. 
 
In a December 18, 1996 order, the district court found 
this argument "disingenuous," and concluded that B&W 
was not entitled to have the court consider the additional 
materials. Citing "an abundance of caution," the court 
nevertheless looked at the new documents, and concluded 
that B&W had presented no triable issues of fact, as the 
motion for reconsideration and new documents "merely 
revisit[ed] arguments previously made and rejected." 
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The court did revise its conclusion concerning damages, 
however. The court held that it had misconstrued the scope 
of United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co.,5 
F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993), and that the North Star case left 
open the question of how to calculate back pay damages 
according to 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(1) in the case of salaried 
employees. The district court concluded that the proper 
award of back pay damages for a 60 day period in the case 
of a salaried employee was simply two months's salary. 
 
On January 28, 1997, the district court entered an order 
calculating a damage award for each of the sales 
representatives in the class of plaintiffs. The total value of 
the judgment was $696,785.44, plus interest from the date 
of the termination. On September 2, 1997, the court 
awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs pursuant to S 29 
U.S.C. S 2104(a)(6) in the amount of $334,466.30 in fees 
and $26,855.83 in expenses. 
 
II. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no 
genuine disputes as to any material facts. See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). In such a case, a trial is unnecessary because a 
reasonable fact finder could not enter a judgment for the 
nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). Accordingly, 
we exercise plenary review, construing all evidence and 
resolving all doubts raised by affidavits, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file in favor 
of the non-moving party. See SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 
124 F.3d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 1997). Our task is to lay out the 
substantive law governing the action, and then in light of 
that law determine whether there is a genuine dispute over 
dispositive facts. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. 
Ct. at 2510. 
 
III. 
 
The issue in this case is whether the district court was 
correct as a matter of law that the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center was the plaintiffs' "single site of 
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employment" according to 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3).5 The 
WARN act does not define the phrase "single site of 
employment." Congress did, however, expressly delegate to 
the Department of Labor the authority to promulgate 
regulations interpreting WARN. See 29 U.S.C.S 2107. These 
regulations must be given "controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 
(1984). 
 
The regulation applicable to this case appears at 20 
C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6). It states: 
 
       For workers whose primary duties require travel from 
       point to point, who are outstationed, or whose primary 
       duties involve work outside any of the employer's 
       regular employment sites (e.g., railroad workers, bus 
       drivers, salespersons), the single site of employment to 
       which they are assigned as their home base, from 
       which their work is assigned, or to which they report 
       will be the single site in which they are covered for 
       WARN purposes. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6) (1989). 
 
This regulation narrows the inquiry considerably: we 
need only consider whether the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center was the site of employment to which 
the sales representatives were assigned as their home base; 
whether the Chester center was the site from which the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3) (West Supp. 1998) states: 
 
       [T]he term "mass layoff" means a reduction in force which-- 
 
       (A) is not the result of a plant closing; and 
 
       (B) results in an employment loss at the single si te of employment 
       during any 30-day period for-- 
 
       (i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (exclu ding any part-
time 
       employees); and 
 
       (II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-tim e employees); 
       or 
 
       (ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees)[.] 
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sales representatives' work was assigned; and whether the 
Chester center was the site to which they reported. If any 
one of these three inquiries can be answered in the 
affirmative, then the Chester center is a covered "single site 
of employment." See Teamsters Local Union 413 v. Driver's, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1996) ("This subpart is 
written in the disjunctive: any one of the alternatives may 
qualify as the definition of `single site.' "). Because at least 
fifty employees lost their jobs following the January 11, 
1995 "sales meetings," a determination that Chester is a 
covered site under WARN as a matter of law would lead us 
to affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs. See 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3)(B)(i). 
 
However, if we conclude as a matter of law that Chester, 
Virginia was not the site of employment to which the sales 
representatives were assigned as their home base, nor the 
site from which their work was assigned, nor the site to 
which they reported, then the Chester center is not a 
covered WARN site. Because the plaintiffs have not 
indicated the existence of any other covered sites at which 
fifty or more employees lost their jobs on January 11, 1995, 
the conclusion that Chester is not a covered site would lead 
us to reverse the order of the district court and enter 
summary judgment for B&W. 
 
Finally, if a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether the Chester center is a covered site for WARN 
purposes, then we must reverse the district court's order 
and remand. 
 
A. 
 
First we consider whether the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center is "the single site of employment to 
which [the sales representatives] are assigned as their home 
base." 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6). The underlying facts here are 
undisputed. Sales representatives spent the great majority 
of their time servicing customers within their geographical 
district. They mostly worked out of their cars, and were in 
frequent contact with their district sales managers, who 
lived within their respective districts and also worked from 
their own homes and cars. Sales representatives did not 
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physically visit Chester, Virginia in the normal course of 
business; however, they did telephone the Chester site on 
a daily basis to check messages and complete 
administrative tasks. 
 
Whether Chester, Virginia was the sales representatives' 
"home base" depends on our legal construction of the term 
"home base" in the Secretary's regulation. B&W argues that 
an employee's assigned "home base" is the place from 
which the employee physically works on a regular basis. 
Under this interpretation, it is argued that the Chester 
center cannot be the sales representatives' home base. In 
contrast, the sales representatives focus less on the 
employee's whereabouts than on the physical location of 
the employer's major contacts with its employees. 
Accordingly, they maintain that an employee's "home base" 
must be a fixed physical building or structure of some kind 
owned by the employer. Because both the sales 
representatives and district sales managers worked from 
their homes and cars, the sales representatives contend 
that the Chester center must by default be considered the 
employees' "home base." 
 
We agree with B&W that a traveling employee's "home 
base" must at a minimum be a location at which the 
employee is physically present at some point during a 
typical business trip. This follows from the text of 20 C.F.R. 
S 639.3(i)(6), which contrasts "the employer's regular 
employment sites" with the site of employment "to which 
[the employees] are assigned as their home base." We think 
that this language cannot be squared with the sales 
representatives's interpretation of "home base," as it 
effectively equates "home base" with a "regular employment 
site." In the context of 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6), we think that 
the term "home base" refers not to the physical base of the 
employer's operations, as the sales representatives would 
have it, but rather to the physical base of the employee. 
 
Our construction is consistent with both Teamsters Local 
Union 413 v. Driver's, Inc., 101 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 
1996) and Wiltz v. M/G Transport Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 
957, 961-62 (6th Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs in Driver's, Inc. 
were eighty-five truck drivers who had been discharged 
without warning. Although their former employer's 
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management functions were located in Delaware, Ohio, the 
drivers had each been permanently assigned to one of 
eleven different base terminals in six different states. The 
maximum number of employees who were assigned to any 
one base terminal was eighteen, such that the plaintiffs' 
right to recover hinged upon whether the drivers' "single 
site of employment" was the one base terminal to which 
they were each assigned, or rather the amalgamation of all 
eleven terminals. Addressing the question of which site was 
the truckers' "home base," the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
each base terminal provided the plaintiffs' home base 
because it was the physical location where "[e]ach trucker 
starts and ends his or her workweek." Id. at 1110. 
 
In Wiltz, the plaintiffs were former crewmen for a towboat 
operator based in Paducah, Kentucky. See Wiltz, 128 F.3d 
at 959. Typically, the crewmen would report to Paducah for 
assignment to the boats, and then embark on a thirty day 
voyage escorting barges throughout the Ohio, Mississippi, 
and Tennessee River Systems, returning in the end to 
Paducah. Following layoffs that prompted a WARN lawsuit, 
the Wiltz court noted (albeit in dicta) that Paducah was the 
crewmen's home base because "80% of the crews physically 
reported to Paducah for assignment to the towboats." Id. at 
962. 
 
In both Driver's, Inc. and Wiltz, the employees' home 
bases were the sites where they began and ended their 
business trips. Accordingly, these cases are consistent with 
our view that a traveling employee's "home base" must be 
a site that the employee visits during the course of a typical 
business trip. 
 
Reviewing the record, there is no evidence that any of the 
plaintiffs regularly visited the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center in the ordinary course of their 
business trips. We know that named plaintiff Thomas A. 
Marshall visited the center only twice, on special trips to 
recognize his outstanding sales record, App. 2266, and that 
named plaintiff Louis A. Ciarlante never visited Chester at 
all. App. 2376. From the record as it now stands, we would 
be inclined to hold as a matter of law that Chester is not 
the sales representatives' "home base." However, because 
we are remanding this case to the district court for further 
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factual development, we will not foreclose the factfinder 
below from examining whether the sales representatives 
can prove that some of their number did in fact use the 
Chester center as their "home base" under the legal 
standard we have enunciated. 
 
B. 
 
We next consider whether the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center was the site "from which [the sales 
representatives'] work [was] assigned." 20 C.F.R. 
S 639.3(i)(6). Our concern here is with the source of the 
"day-to-day" instructions received by the sales 
representatives, notwithstanding "centralized payroll and 
certain other centralized managerial or personnel 
functions." Driver's, Inc., 101 F.3d at 1111 (citing 
International Union, United Mine Workers v. Jim Walter 
Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 724-26 (11th Cir. 1993)). Given 
the unusual working arrangements that 20 C.F.R. 
S 639.3(i)(6) covers, this legal standard may require a 
developed factual record in order to distinguish the true 
source of the instructions from mere conduits through 
which the instructions passed. We look to the record to 
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to whether the Chester, Virginia center was the source of 
the day-to-day instructions for the sales representatives.6 
 
The statements offered by the sales representatives 
indicate that Chester was the origin of day-to-day 
instructions. Thomas J. Ogorek, who served as a district 
sales manager from August 1993 until January 1995, 
declared that "sales representatives . . . generally received 
instructions and assignments on what to sell our 
customers in letters and memos . . . . [sent] by mail from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the district court appears to have considered the documents 
submitted along with B&W's motion for reconsideration, we will respect 
the district court's explicit finding that B&W was not entitled to such 
review. Accordingly, we will limit review to the record as it existed at 
the 
time of the district court's consideration of the cross-motions for 
summary judgment. See DeLong v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 
1140 (3d Cir. 1980). On remand, however, the district court will be able 
to include these additional documents as part of the record. 
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our Chester Office." App. 1936. Similarly, the plaintiffs offer 
the declaration of Marc Lowery, who worked at the Chester 
center from 1986 until 1995. Lowery reported that "[t]he 
Chester office supplied the [daily instruction] information, 
and was the engine for the field's activity. We supplied what 
to do, where to do it, and the materials for doing it." App. 
2217. Lowery reported that it was his responsibility 
 
        to coordinate and issue, out of the Chester Office, all 
       releases, bulletins and instructions to the field sales 
       organization, including the field sales representatives 
       and the district sales managers. These included the 
       day-to-day instructions, assignments and procedures 
       to be followed by the field sales representatives and 
       district sales managers. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        It was through these letters and instructions coming 
       from the Chester Office that field salespersons were 
       told what specific products management wanted them 
       to sell and promote and how they were to do it through 
       specific promotional strategies that they must use. 
 
App. 2209-10. 
 
B&W responds with statements indicating that the 
Chester, Virginia site was not the source of day-to-day 
instructions. Central to this response is the statement of 
Randy Groonwald, a former district sales manager from 
Wisconsin, who reported that the sales representatives in 
his district "were assigned work . . . by me . . . [and] were 
not assigned work by anyone in Chester, Virginia." App. 
1018. Groonwald also verified the accuracy of B&W's 
representation that instruction and development of sales 
representatives was a district sales manager's primary task, 
and also that it was part of the sales manager's job to 
manage sales productivity and allocate sales efforts. App. 
1017-18; App. 1223. In addition, B&W relies on the 
deposition of named plaintiff Thomas A. Marshall, a former 
sales representative. Marshall was asked, "[d]id you ever 
take any orders from anyone at the administrative center 
down in Chester, Virginia?" His response: "No, I didn't." 
App. 2270. 
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These conflicting statements force us to conclude that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
the Chester, Virginia center was the location from which 
work was assigned to the sales representatives. If we were 
to credit the statements of Ogorek and Lowery over those of 
Groonwald and Marshall, then we would conclude that 
Chester is the location from which work was assigned; if we 
were to credit Groonwald and Marshall over Ogorek and 
Lowery, then we would conclude that it was not. The 
summary judgment standard forbids us from making these 
judgments, however. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249 
("[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is 
not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth 
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue for trial."). Accordingly, we hold that this is a material 
issue for trial. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, we consider whether there is an issue as to 
whether Chester was the site "to which [the sales 
representatives] report[ed]." 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6). This 
inquiry focuses on the location of the personnel who were 
primarily responsible for reviewing sales reports and other 
information sent by the sales representatives, in order to 
record sales, assess employee performance, develop new 
sales strategies, and the like. 
 
Reviewing the record, we hold that there is a genuine 
issue of fact concerning whether the Chester center was the 
site to which the sales representatives reported. The 
plaintiffs have offered statements indicating that Chester 
was the primary audience for the sales representatives' 
reports. For example, Mark Lowery reported that "[t]he 
Chester office is where all reported information flowed and 
. . . where it all ended up." App. 2217. Similarly, Thomas 
Ogorek declared that "[f]ield sales representatives . . . 
reported all . . . employment-related information to the 
Chester office." App. 1936. Ogorek acknowledged that 
district sales managers such as himself sometimes played 
a role in the reporting process, but stated that his role was 
secondary: "I would facilitate the Chester office by collecting 
the information and forms from the . . . sales 
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representatives, and [by] then funneling them to the 
Chester office." Id. 
 
In contrast, B&W has offered statements indicating that 
the sales representatives reported primarily to the district 
sales managers. Plaintiff Thomas A. Marshall indicated at 
his deposition that he submitted all summaries of his sales 
performance to his district sales manager, and that he 
regularly left messages for his district sales manager on the 
manager's voicemail. App. 2267-68. District sales manager 
Randy Groonwald reported that the sales representatives in 
his district "hand-delivered or mailed to me daily call 
summaries detailing their activities [every] week," and that 
they "did not report to anyone in Chester, Virginia." App. 
1018. Groonwald also stated that the company's official job 
description for the sales representative position was 
accurate in its statement of the major contacts that sales 
representatives would have with other company employees. 
App. 1017. The description states that the major contact 
was "[f]requent contact with District Sales Manager to keep 
him/her informed of all developments," and does not 
mention contact with the Chester center. App. 1226. 
 
These statements submitted by the sales representatives 
and B&W are in conflict. According to the former, the sales 
representatives reported to the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center; according to the latter, the sales 
representatives reported to their local district sales 
managers. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the Chester site was the location to which the 
sales representatives reported, precluding resolution on 
summary judgment.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In his dissent, Chief Judge Becker takes issue with our determination 
that the present record presents genuine issues of material fact that 
preclude resolution on summary judgment. According to Chief Judge 
Becker, "th[e] evidence is not in conflict, but instead commands the 
conclusion that the Chester center was the ultimate site from which the 
plaintiffs' work was assigned and to which they reported." Dissenting Op. 
at 26. 
 
As we see it, Chief Judge Becker's attempt to harmonize statements 
that on their face are in conflict is contrary to our duty to view 
inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 
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IV. 
 
In summary, we conclude that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to whether the Chester, Virginia 
administrative center was a "single site of employment" 
according to 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6) and 29 U.S.C. 
S 2101(a)(3)(B). We will therefore reverse the order of the 
district court granting the sales representatives' motion for 
summary judgment and denying B&W's motion for the 
same, and remand for proceedings consistent with the 
foregoing opinion. 
 
On remand, the parties and the district court should 
focus attention on the precise questions of whether the 
Chester, Virginia center was the representatives' home 
base, the site from which the sales representatives' work 
was assigned, and the site to which they reported. The 
Company's own actions in characterizing its "notice" sent to 
local government officials as being required under WARN, 
and its suggestion that the sales representatives were 
considered "employees at the Chester facility,"8 will 
undoubtedly be relevant and material to these inquiries, as 
will the Company's conduct on January 11, 1995. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
party opposing summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citing 
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 994 
(1962)). That we might be able to hypothesize a theory that could 
conceivably be consistent with what certain declarants intended to say 
(but did not) is neither our function nor our concern. Rather, our charge 
is to determine whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). We believe 
that the answer to that inquiry is yes, and that it is not our role as an 
appellate court to go further. See Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Anderson, 
921 F.2d 497, 504 (3d Cir. 1990) ("This court is not a factfinding 
tribunal."). 
 
Upon review of the entire record, we are constrained by our 
established jurisprudence to return this proceeding to the district court 
so that the facts bearing on the "single site" question can be developed 
at trial. 
 
8. See supra note 3. 
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Given the unorthodox employment arrangements at issue 
in this case, conclusory statements that the plaintiffs were 
or were not assigned work "from" Chester, and that they 
did or did not report "to" Chester, will generally prove 
inadequate. The problem with such statements is that in 
our era of modern telecommunications, it is often necessary 
to distinguish the ultimate origin and destination of 
information from mere conduits through which the 
information has passed. An instruction may originate in 
one location, be routed electronically through another, be 
stored on a machine in a third, and then be received by an 
individual located in a fourth. In an unhelpful sense, it can 
be said that the instruction was assigned "from" any of the 
first three locations, and that it was sent "to" any of the 
latter three. Conclusory statements made in this context 
are likely to interfere with the ability of district courts to 
enter summary judgment, as they will lead to facially 
contradictory factual assertions. To avoid this problem in 
the future, we emphasize that we interpret 20 C.F.R. 
S 639.3(i)(6) to focus not on the formalities of where certain 
machines were located, but rather on where the people 
were who were ultimately responsible for creating and 
receiving the information. On remand, the district court 
should focus its inquiry accordingly. 
 
V. 
 
In remanding the "single site" issue to the district court, 
it is not inappropriate for this court to provide guidance to 
the district court on the question of damages. See, e.g., 
Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Med. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 
188, 200 (3d Cir. 1992). In particular, we feel compelled to 
consider two questions that were briefed and argued fully 
before us. These questions are 1) whether the district court 
erred in holding that the proper baseline measure of 
damages was two months' salary, and 2) whether the 
district court correctly held that the severance payments 
paid by B&W to the sales representatives should not be 
subtracted from the damage award. Both are legal issues 
upon which we exercise plenary review. 
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A. 
 
The WARN Act specifies that any employer who violates 
the Act "shall be liable to each aggrieved employee . . . for 
. . . back pay for each day of violation at a rate of 
compensation not less than the higher of [either] the 
average regular rate received by such employee during the 
last 3 years of the employee's employment [or] the final 
regular rate received by such employee." 29 U.S.C. 
S 2104(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998). This statute requires us to 
establish the number of days in a given violation, and then 
multiply that number by an employee's regular rate of pay 
per day, in order to arrive at a starting point for the damage 
award owed to each aggrieved employee.9  
 
In United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 
5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993), we interpreted only thefirst part 
of this formula.10 In that case, we held that the number of 
days in a given violation period was the number of calendar 
days in the violation period, rather than the number of 
actual work days.11 Thus, in a case where there was no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. This statute provides a starting point because the resulting figure may 
then be modified by additional considerations as directed by 29 U.S.C. 
S 2104(a)(1)(B) and 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(2)-(7). 
 
10. Judge Seitz, writing for the court, stated the issue in North Star as 
follows: 
 
       The sole issue appealed by defendant is the number of days for 
       which it must pay damages to its aggrieved employees under Section 
       2104(a)(1)(A) of WARN. The district court interpreted that section 
to 
       require that defendant pay damages for each calendar day within 
       the violation period. Defendant argues that Section 2104(a)(1)(A) 
       does not require it to pay damages to an aggrieved employee for any 
       day within the violation period that would not have been a regular 
       workday for that employee. 
 
       5 F.3d at 41. 
 
11. We recognize that some courts have criticized North Star and have 
rejected its analysis. See Saxion v. Titan-C-Manufacturing, Inc., 86 F.3d 
553, 559 (6th Cir. 1996); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 772 
(10th Cir. 1995); Carpenters District Council v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 15 
F.3d 1275, 1283-86 (5th Cir. 1994). However, we are bound to adhere to 
our prior precedents. See Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedures 
9.1. 
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warning prior to the plant closing or mass layoff, we have 
held that an employer would be liable for an award covering 
the full 60 day period specified as a maximum violation 
period in the statute, rather than a shorter period. See id. 
at 42-43; 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(1). Because the sales 
representatives here were obviously given no warning prior 
to their layoffs, an application of North Star to our case 
directs the conclusion that their damages must be 
calculated using a 60 day violation period. 
 
The next question we must answer is how to determine 
an employee's regular rate of pay per day. Because the 
sales representatives were salaried employees, we must 
determine how to convert the given annual salary rate into 
a daily rate of pay. The parties offer competing 
methodologies. The sales representatives contend that 
under North Star we must divide the annual salary by the 
number of days the sales representatives actually worked in 
a given year. Because the sales representatives were not 
expected to work weekends or holidays, they claim that the 
district court's damage award of two months' salary, by 
eliminating weekends and holidays, represented back pay 
for only about 40 actual working days (60 days minus 
weekends and holidays), rather than the full 60 actual 
working days mandated by North Star. 
 
B&W disagrees with the sales representatives' approach, 
and insists that the daily rate should be calculated by 
dividing the annual salary of each representative by 365, 
the number of days in a year. According to B&W, North Star 
establishes that the regular daily rate is the pay for each 
actual working day only for hourly employees. Because 
salaried employees such as the sales representatives are 
exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act and may be 
forced to work overtime and weekends, B&W argues that a 
different approach is warranted in the case of salaried 
employees. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that our North Star 
precedent was silent as to whether the plaintiffs in that 
case were hourly or salaried employees of North Star Steel 
Company. Indeed, North Star offers no guidance on how to 
convert to a daily rate, either from an annual rate (in the 
case of salaried employees) or from an hourly one (in the 
 
                                21 
  
case of hourly employees). The North Star court expressly 
declined to address this matter, as the parties in that case 
had stipulated to the daily rate and had asked the court 
only to decide the number of days in the violation period. 
See 5 F.3d at 43, 43 n.7. Thus, the sales representatives 
misconstrue North Star when they claim it supports their 
approach to calculating a daily rate, and B&W does the 
same when it attempts to distinguish it on the basis, 
unstated in the opinion, that the employees in that case 
were paid on an hourly basis. 
 
After examining the arguments raised by the parties, we 
agree with B&W -- and the district court -- that the proper 
way to convert an annual salary rate into a daily rate is 
simply to divide the annual salary by the number of days 
in a year. We believe that this approach best serves the 
Congressional intent because it reflects the reality that a 
salaried employee is generally hired to perform a particular 
task, regardless (within reason) of the time required to 
complete the task. Indeed, to attempt to measure how 
many days a salaried employee "actually works" in a given 
year is to engage in needless abstraction. What does it 
mean to "work a day"? Has an employee who has opted to 
work twelve hours per day for four days per week worked 
fewer "days" than another who works eight hours per day 
for six days per week? We leave these questions for the 
philosophers. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the regular daily rate of a 
salaried employee is the employee's annual salary divided 
by the number of days in a year.12 
 
B. 
 
The final issue we address is whether the district court 
correctly held that the severance payments made by B&W 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The district court's calculations based on the equivalent of two 
months' salary was almost, but not quite, correct. Because we normally 
base an annual calculation on 365 days, we think it is the better 
practice for the district court to divide an employee's annual salary by 
365, and then multiply that rate by number of the days of the violation 
period. 
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to the sales representatives pursuant to the Company's 
ERISA plan should not be subtracted from the damage 
figures. B&W argues that these payments should have been 
subtracted from the damage figure because they 
constituted "wages" according to 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(2)(A).13 
For evidence, B&W points to the fact that the severance 
payments were labeled "salary continuation" payments, and 
that they matched the wages that B&W paid when the sales 
representatives were working. 
 
We find B&W's argument to be without merit. The 
severance payments made by B&W are not "wages" as 
contemplated by 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(2)(A), but rather ERISA 
payments that the company was already legally obligated to 
make regardless of the work the sales representatives 
performed. The fact that these payments happened to be 
labeled "salary continuation" benefits, and that they 
happened to be set at the level of the sales representatives' 
wages, is irrelevant. The payments made by B&W were not 
made in exchange for work that the sales representatives 
would have performed during the period of the violation. 
Accordingly, they are not "wages" according to 29 U.S.C. 
S 2104(a)(2)(A), and the district court was correct in 
refusing to subtract these amounts from the damages 
award. See 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(1)(B) (expressly including 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998) states: 
 
        The amount for which an employer is liable under paragraph (1) 
       shall be reduced by-- 
 
        (A) any wages paid by the employer to the employe e for the period 
       of the violation; 
 
        (B) any voluntary and unconditional payment by th e employer to 
       the employee that is not required by any legal obligation; and 
 
        (C) any payment by the employer to a third party or trustee (such 
       as premiums for health benefits or payments to a defined 
       contribution pension plan) on behalf of and attributable to the 
       employee for the period of the violation. 
 
        In addition, any liability incurred under paragraph (1) with 
respect 
       to a defined benefit pension plan may be reduced by crediting the 
       employee with service for all purposes under such a plan for the 
       period of the violation. 
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ERISA benefits in WARN damages calculations); Tobin v. 
Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 838 F. Supp. 262, 273 n.17 
(S.D.W.Va. 1993). 
 
If, after remand, the plaintiffs prevail in this action, the 
damages must be calculated accordingly. 
 
VI. 
 
We hold that a genuine dispute exists concerning 
whether the Chester, Virginia administrative center is a 
single site of employment covered by WARN. Accordingly, 
we will reverse the January 28, 1997 order of the district 
court entering summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and 
will remand for proceedings consistent with the foregoing 
opinion. As the sales representatives are no longer a 
"prevailing party" according to 29 U.S.C. S 2104(a)(6), we 
must also vacate the order of the district court dated 
September 2, 1997, which had awarded attorney's fees to 
the plaintiff class. 
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BECKER,* Chief Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I join in Part V of the majority opinion which provides 
guidance to the district court on the question of damages. 
I also subscribe to the majority's conclusion that the 
determination of plaintiffs' "single site of employment" is 
governed by 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6). Nonetheless, I am 
constrained to dissent from Parts III and IV of the majority 
opinion since I believe that, under the legal precepts 
announced therein, the Chester center was clearly the 
plaintiffs' single site of employment, and that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact on that question. I would 
therefore affirm the district court's order granting the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability. 
 
I. 
 
It will be useful to commence the discussion of the 
liability issue by rescribing the guidance that the majority 
imparts to the district court at the close of its liability 
discussion. 
 
       Given the unorthodox employment arrangements at 
       issue in this case, conclusory statements that the 
       plaintiffs were or were not assigned work "from" 
       Chester, and that they did or did not report "to" 
       Chester, will generally prove inadequate. The problem 
       with such statements is that in our era of modern 
       telecommunications, it is often necessary to distinguish 
       the ultimate origin and destination of information from 
       mere conduits through which the information is 
       passed. 
 
       * * * 
 
       To avoid this problem in the future, we emphasize that 
       we interpret 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6) to focus not on the 
       formalities of where certain machines were located, but 
       rather on where the people were who were ultimately 
       responsible for creating and receiving the information. 
       On remand, the district court should focus its inquiry 
       accordingly. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the Third 
Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
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Maj. Op. at 19 (emphasis added). I agree with the majority 
that in applying 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6) to this case, a court 
must be careful to distinguish "mere conduits" from those 
people "ultimately responsible for creating and receiving the 
information" from the sales representatives. I dissent 
essentially because I believe that the majority has failed to 
faithfully apply its own precepts. 
 
If the majority had done so, it would have been compelled 
by the evidence to conclude, as the district court already 
has, that: 
 
       The record in this case establishes, without any 
       genuine dispute, that all instructions, assignments, 
       rules, and orders to the plaintiff salesmen emanated 
       from the Chester Virginia administrative headquarters. 
       [It is not] significant that, to some extent, specific 
       assignments and instructions were issued by way of 
       the district managers, or that plaintiffs' reports to the 
       administrative headquarters were funneled through 
       their district managers. 
 
Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 
CIV.A.95-4646, 1996 WL 65448, *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 1996) 
(emphasis added). The highlighted portion of the district 
court opinion reflects the uncontroverted evidence that both 
the sales representatives and the sales managers reported 
back to the Chester center from which they received their 
assignments and from which all of their day to day needs 
were handled. In other words, the evidence shows that the 
sales managers acted as conduits between the Chester 
center and the sales representatives. It is only by ignoring 
this evidence, and hence its own admonition to look to who 
was "ultimately responsible for creating and receiving the 
information", that the majority can conclude that a genuine 
issue of material fact is raised by evidence that the sales 
representatives received instructions from and reported to 
both the Chester center and their sales managers. 
 
As I will show, this evidence is not in conflict, but instead 
commands the conclusion that the Chester center was the 
ultimate site from which the plaintiffs' work was assigned 
and to which they reported. Since I believe that the 
evidence is so clear that the Chester center was the site 
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from which plaintiffs' work was assigned and the site to 
which they reported, I do not deal with whether the Chester 
center was also their "home base" as that phrase is used in 
20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6). 
 
A. 
 
I turn first to whether the Chester center was the site 
from "which [the sales representatives'] work [was] 
assigned." 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6). The majority 
acknowledges that there is abundant evidence that Chester 
was the source of plaintiffs' day to day assignments. See 
Maj. Op. at 14-15. However, the majority finds a genuine 
issue of material fact on the basis of two pieces of evidence 
that "conflict" with this view. The first is the statement of 
Randy Groonwald, a former sales manager in Wisconsin, 
that the sales representatives in his district "were assigned 
work . . . by me . . . [and] were not assigned work by 
anyone in Chester, Virginia." App. 1018. The second is the 
following snippet from the deposition of Thomas A. 
Marshall, a named plaintiff, and former sales 
representative: 
 
       Q. Did you ever take any orders from anyone at the 
          administrative center down in Chester, Virginia? 
 
       A. No, I didn't. 
 
App. 2270. 
 
As I will show, however, Groonwald's statement conflicts 
with the view that Chester was the ultimate source of the 
sales representatives' assignments only if one ignores, as 
the majority apparently has, the uncontroverted evidence 
that the Chester center was the source of assignments for 
both the district sales managers and the sales 
representatives. Marshall's testimony, when placed in 
context, not only does not create a genuine issue of 
material fact, but strongly counsels in favor of summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs. 
 
1. 
 
Marc Lowery and Dwight Hughes, former employees at 
the Chester center, described the process by which 
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assignments were distributed to American Tobaccofield 
sales personnel. Lowery declared that: 
 
       [My job was] to coordinate and issue, out of the 
       Chester office, all releases, bulletins and instructions 
       to the field sales organization, including the field sales 
       representatives and the district sales managers. These 
       included the day-to-day instructions, assignments and 
       procedures to be followed by the field sales 
       representatives and district sales managers. 
 
       * * * 
 
       It was through these letters and instructions coming 
       from the Chester office that field salespersons were told 
       what specific products management wanted them to 
       sell and promote and how they were to do it through 
       specific promotional strategies that they must use. 
       These instructions in the form of "Sales Coverage" 
       letters were regularly issued from the Chester office 
       every five (5) to eight (8) weeks. 
 
App. 2209-10. (emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, Hughes stated that: 
 
       Sales representatives and district sales managers 
       received their instructions and assignments in the form 
       of written memos or letters that we called `field sales 
       information,' `sales campaign,' or `sales coverage' 
       letters. These instructions and assignments were 
       generally issued in mass mailings [from the Chester 
       Office]. 
 
... 
 
       [These letters] told the sales representatives and district 
       sales managers what to sell and how to sell it. 
 
App. 2186. (emphasis added). 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, Groonwald's statement that 
the sales representatives in his district "were assigned work 
. . . by me . . . [and] were not assigned work by anyone in 
Chester, Virginia" is easily reconciled with the evidence that 
the Chester center was the ultimate source of all of 
plaintiffs' assignments. The fact is that nowhere in 
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Groonwald's affidavit does he contradict the evidence that, 
like all sales mangers, he received the day to day 
assignments that he gave to his sales representatives from 
the Chester office. Thus, at most, Groonwald's affidavit 
indicates that he served as a conduit between Chester and 
his sales representatives. As the majority noted, mere 
conduits must be disregarded in the effort to determine the 
ultimate source of plaintiffs' day to day assignments. 
 
2. 
 
The majority also relies on the following portion of 
Thomas Marshall's deposition: 
 
       Q. Did you ever take any orders from anyone at the 
          administrative center down in Chester, Virginia? 
 
       A. No, I didn't. 
 
This excerpt, when returned to its proper context, provides 
no support for remand. 
 
First, a review of the testimony preceding the excerpt 
makes clear that when Marshall stated that he did not 
receive instructions from anyone at Chester, he simply 
meant that he did not receive instructions from any 
particular person at Chester: 
 
       Q. You didn't answer my question. Who in Chester, 
          Virginia did you report to? 
 
       A. Well to the company itself. 
 
       Q. So there is no person that you reported to there? 
 
       A. There is no person. 
 
       Q. So you did not have a boss in Chester, Virginia; is 
          that right? 
 
       A. Well, there's lots of bosses in Chester, Virginia. 
 
       Q. Was there a particular person, a boss that told you 
          what to do in Chester, Virginia, that you -- 
 
       A. No. 
 
       Q. -- can identify today? 
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       A. No. 
 
App. 2260. 
 
More fundamentally, the overall content of Marshall's 
testimony unequivocally supports the view that the sales 
representatives received their assignments from the Chester 
center. Nowhere is the imprudence of the majority's reliance 
on Marshall's testimony to preclude summary judgment 
more in evidence then in the following exchange: 
 
       Q. You make a distinction between supervising and 
          reporting; is that right? 
 
       A. Yes, I think I do. 
 
       Q. Now, explain that to me, in your own words. 
 
       A. Well, I believe that there were supervisors, 
          supervising the sales reps in the field. But I think 
          that the sales reps, we were instructed by the 
          [Chester] office, and the office seemed to have full 
          control of us. Anything we did out there seemed to 
          relate to the office. I could not get hold of Mr. 
          Ogorek [his sales manager] if I wanted to, except 
          on voice mail. 
 
          Tom Ogorek didn't tell me what to do out there in 
          the field. I was sent a campaign letter from Chester, 
          Virginia stating what I was to do, and how long I 
          was to do it, how much I was to spend, and the 
          brands I was to work. They made the changes in 
          the field. If there was an executive order out there 
          changing our field operation, it came from voice 
          mail. 
 
App. 2260. (emphasis added) 
 
In short, none of the evidence relied on by the majority 
conflicts with the view that the ultimate source of the sales 
representatives' assignments was the Chester center. 
 
B. 
 
While a determination that the plaintiffs' work was 
assigned from the Chester center is, by itself, a sufficient 
basis on which to affirm the district court, see Maj. Op. at 
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10-11, I also believe that the majority errs in concluding 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the Chester center was the site to "which [the sales 
representatives] report[ed]." 20 C.F.R.S 639.3(i)(6). The 
majority reaches this conclusion by finding a conflict 
between, for example, the statement of Mark Lowery, who 
worked at the Chester center from 1986 to 1995, that "[t]he 
Chester office is where all reported information flowed and 
. . . where it all ended up" and the statement of Randy 
Groonwald that the sales representatives in his district 
"hand-delivered or mailed to me daily call summaries 
detailing their activities [every] week," and that they "did 
not report to anyone in Chester, Virginia." However, it is 
only by ignoring the import of evidence critical to its inquiry 
-- evidence that the sales representatives reported to 
Chester through the sales managers -- that the majority is 
able to find a conflict between these statements. 
 
The role of the sales managers in the American Tobacco 
"reporting process", is best summarized by Joseph Pierce, 
the former head of Sales Audit and Analysis for American 
Tobacco: 
 
       I understand that in earlier years the original expense 
       report forms were mailed directly to the Chester office 
       from the homes of each field sales representative, 
       which resulted in our receiving a thousand or so 
       separate envelopes from all over the country. 
       Eventually, we used the district sales managers to 
       collect the original report forms from the field sales 
       representatives in their group, and the district sales 
       managers would send the originals to the Chester 
       office, which resulted in our receiving only about 150 
       or so envelopes (the number of district sales managers) 
       from fewer locations. 
 
       In this regard the district sales manager assisted the 
       Chester office, to the extent they eyeballed the forms, 
       unstapled papers, matched the receipts to the proper 
       form, and otherwise organized the paperwork in a form 
       that made it easier for our staff in the Chester office to 
       review and analyze each of the approximately 1,000 
       field sales representative's expense reports and 
       paperwork. Even after we started using the district 
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       sales managers to funnel the paperwork from the field 
       to the Chester Office, it was still the Chester Office 
       which reviewed and analyzed the field sales 
       representatives' expense reports and approved for 
       processing (or disapproved) the reports. 
 
App. 2202- 03. (emphasis added). 
 
Pierce's statement is confirmed by other evidence that 
makes clear that all of the plaintiffs' reports (be they sales 
or expense reports) ultimately flowed to the Chester center, 
and that, to the extent that the district sales managers 
helped funnel the information from the field, they were 
assisting and facilitating the work of the Chester center. 
Based on this understanding of the American Tobacco 
"reporting process", I believe that there is no genuine issue 
of fact that the sales managers were merely conduits 
through which the plaintiffs reported to the Chester center, 
and thus that the Chester center was the site to which the 
plaintiffs' reported. I would affirm the district court on this 
basis as well.1 
 
C. 
 
Out of an abundance of caution, I address the 
contention, raised by the defendants, that the Chester 
center itself was just a conduit since the assignments that 
it sent to the field personnel and the reports that it received 
were passed through it to the executive offices of American 
Tobacco located in Stamford, Connecticut. The majority 
does not focus on this possible view of the evidence and 
instead frames the choice of plaintiffs' single site of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I am not sure what to make of the majority's statement at the outset 
of this section that its "inquiry focuses on the location of the personnel 
who were primarily responsible for reviewing[the plaintiffs' reports]." 
Maj. Op at 16 (emphasis added). While I believe that the personnel at the 
Chester center were both primarily and ultimately responsible for 
reviewing the reports, I am uncertain as to how much of the majority's 
analysis turns on a distinction between these two terms -- or even 
whether the shifting terminology is intentional. At all events, I believe 
that this inconsistency should not affect the majority's instruction to 
the 
district court to focus its inquiry on remand on those "ultimately 
responsible for creating and receiving the information." 
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employment as being between the Chester center and the 
geographical districts in which the plaintiffs' worked. 
However, I address this argument, because the defendants 
may attempt to revive it on remand. 
 
While there has been insufficient factual development for 
us to determine whether in fact the Stamford office was the 
location "of the people who were ultimately responsible for 
creating and receiving the information" from the plaintiffs, 
I do not believe that such development is necessary to the 
disposition of this case. Even if the defendants were to 
succeed in showing that the Stamford office, rather than 
the Chester center, was the plaintiffs' single site of 
employment, the defendants would still be liable under the 
WARN Act, as a matter of law, since the "mass layoff" 
would still have resulted "in an employment loss at the 
single site of employment . . . for . . . at least 50 
employees." See 29 U.S.C. S 2101(a)(3)(B). 
 
D. 
 
Before concluding, I must consider the broader, policy- 
based aspect of the issue. This is the first time that a court 
has been asked to apply 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6) to determine 
the single site of employment for a geographically dispersed 
workforce that does not physically report to any site of 
employment at any time. Cf. Wiltz v. M/G Transport 
Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 957 (6th Cir. 1997) (issue was 
whether separate towboats on which plaintiffs lived during 
30 day assignments or defendant's main office to which 
over 80% of the crews physically reported for assignments 
to towboats was single site of employment pursuant to 20 
C.F.R. S 639.3(i)(6)); Teamsters Local Union 413 v. Driver's, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1107 (6th Cir. 1996) (issue was whether 
eleven separate trucking terminals to which plaintiffs 
physically reported could be combined to constitute one 
single site of employment under the Act). 
 
The majority observes that the employment arrangement 
at issue is "unorthodox." See Maj. Op. at 19. I take this to 
mean that it believes that this case represents something of 
an outlier. I disagree. Rather, I suspect that such situations 
represent the new frontier in WARN Act litigation. In the 
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next decade, technology will permit workers of all types, not 
just salespeople or other mobile workers, to escape the 
physical confines of traditional offices. I acknowledge that 
the majority has recognized the possibility that such 
plaintiffs may prevail within the framework of 20 C.F.R. 
S 639.3(i)(6), hence the remand here for further 
proceedings. However the tenor of the majority opinion, and 
its refusal to affirm the grant of summary judgment for 
plaintiffs on what I believe to be an unequivocal record, 
sends the opposite (and wrong) message and, I think, 
establishes bad precedent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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